{"id":22793,"date":"2024-04-02T19:27:47","date_gmt":"2024-04-02T23:27:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/?p=22793"},"modified":"2024-10-15T19:39:14","modified_gmt":"2024-10-15T23:39:14","slug":"minimum-elements-to-tackle-organized-crime-and-state-capture","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/2024\/04\/02\/minimum-elements-to-tackle-organized-crime-and-state-capture\/","title":{"rendered":"Minimum elements to tackle organized crime and state capture"},"content":{"rendered":"

Leer en espa\u00f1ol\u00a0aqu\u00ed<\/a>.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

A triad composed of strong state institutions, the articulation of civil society and international support is needed. Among the most effective instruments include actions against money laundering, extinguishing illegally acquired domain and publicly exposing criminal activities and infiltration of state institutions.<\/em><\/p>\n

In recent years, it has become increasingly evident that Latin American countries are threatened by\u00a0organized crime<\/strong>. In many cases,\u00a0state institutions\u00a0<\/strong>are being\u00a0infiltrated. This phenomenon goes hand in hand with an extreme increase in drug trafficking. Global cocaine production has doubled in the last 10 years, with Latin America playing a prominent role. A prime example is Ecuador, which just five years ago was considered a stable and relatively safe country. Even in countries with low levels of corruption<\/strong>, such as Costa Rica and Chile, there are worrying trends.<\/p>\n

Given this reality, the question arises as to what minimum requirements must be met to fight organized crime and state infiltration throughout the subcontinent.<\/p>\n

Strong and effective state institutions can do a good job of prevention, as well as exert strong investigative pressure and reduce impunity. These are key elements in the fight against organized crime. Consequently, organized crime seeks to weaken such institutions and, if possible, infiltrate them with individuals they trust.<\/p>\n

In extreme cases, such as Grand Corruption<\/strong>, there is collaboration between government agencies, corrupt companies, and organized crime. The more advanced such a process is, the more difficult it is for governments, parliaments or judicial bodies to take action against criminal forces. The government of the new Guatemalan President Bernardo Ar\u00e9valo, who took office with a clear anti-corruption agenda, is facing this major criminal resistance.<\/p>\n

At the institutional level, it is essential to implement minimum requirements in selection procedures for judges<\/strong> and prosecutors<\/strong>. Such roles should be appointed solely on the basis of objective criteria of merit, integrity, reliability and capacity. Procedures that excludes the influence of politics, interest groups or, in the worst case, organized crime, must be found.<\/p>\n

The independence and capacities of existing\u00a0institutions of integrity must be\u00a0strengthened. This means creating or maintaining an adequate legal framework that guarantees judicial <\/strong>independence<\/strong> and criminal prosecution. Independence and integrity are key principles of the judiciary, and must be mutually reinforcing to prevent the risk of corruption within the judiciary. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct offer a set of international standards on judicial integrity that should be implemented.<\/p>\n

The drastic example of Ecuador demonstrates that\u00a0prisons\u00a0can not only degenerate into parallel worlds and schools of crime. They can also become command centers for organized crime. It is therefore of utmost importance that prisons are managed efficiently and free of criminal influences.<\/p>\n

The greater the influence of organized crime in a state, the greater the need for clear articulation and pressure from civil society. As long as democratic principles are not suspended de jure or de facto by an autocratization of the political system, citizens can send a clear signal against corruption and state infiltration with their votes in elections; as happened in Honduras in 2021 and in Guatemala in 2023.<\/p>\n

Public pressure\u00a0can positively influence political developments, as was observed during the inauguration of President Ar\u00e9valo, or in the processes of establishing the anti-corruption and impunity missions CICIG in Guatemala and MACCIH in Honduras. Transparency can be created through\u00a0observatories\u00a0created by civil society organizations. Erroneous trends can be counteracted by creating public awareness of corruption or infiltration of state institutions.<\/p>\n

Civil society organizations can also\u00a0give a voice to victims\u00a0of corruption and organized crime. This can play a particularly important role when state measures against organized crime pose at the same time a concrete threat to the principles of the rule of law or human rights, which can currently be observed in El Salvador.<\/p>\n

The Ecuadorian government\u2019s hard anticrime policy <\/strong>shows how difficult it is to find the right balance between necessary repression of organized crime and\u00a0respect for human rights. International human rights obligations <\/strong>must be included as a necessary element in the catalog of minimum requirements for combating crime.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0support of the international community\u00a0is especially important in cases of advanced infiltration of a state. This may be political support, as is currently needed by the new Guatemalan president. International cooperation can also support criminal law reforms and prosecutions through advice, international presence or participation in trials. The most comprehensive model is the proposal for an\u00a0International Anti-Corruption Court<\/strong>, which would guarantee the independence of judges. However, it is unlikely that such a court can be established in the short term.\u00a0Hybrid missions\u00a0such as CICIG, MACCIH or the possible CICIH for Honduras also defend the independence and integrity of the judiciary in criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n

In recent years, it has been widely recognized that\u00a0anti-money laundering<\/strong>\u00a0and\u00a0asset forfeiture<\/strong>\u00a0are effective measures to combat corruption and organized crime. Assets acquired through illicit activities are the Achilles heel of organized crime. Therefore, money must be traced in the context of criminal investigations. The tools of financial investigation and asset forfeiture must be available and utilized.<\/p>\n

Governments of countries particularly affected and infiltrated by organized crime may face a\u00a0dilemma. If the economy and investments depend to a significant extent on illegally acquired assets, consistent anti-money laundering measures may harm the economic development of the country and cause discontent among the population. The question arises as to the political will to take serious measures against money laundering. Taking into account such situations, it will be useful to have strong, honest and independent institutions that can carry out investigations, criminal prosecution and confiscation of illicitly acquired domain.<\/p>\n

Especially in the prosecution of corruption and money laundering offenses, it is essential to\u00a0improve cooperation\u00a0with various institutions outside the criminal prosecution itself, such as banking or financial supervisory authorities, financial administrations or courts of auditors. Due to the transnational nature of money flows, law enforcement treaties and international cooperation are of particular importance.<\/p>\n

The instrument of cooperation with\u00a0key witnesses\u00a0has proven to be very useful. In addition, ways must be found to effectively\u00a0protect prosecutors and judges, who are often under serious threat.<\/p>\n

It has\u00a0not yet\u00a0been possible to implement a\u00a0universal and comprehensive strategy\u00a0against organized crime and state capture\u00a0in any country. A concrete,\u00a0multidisciplinary analysis\u00a0in the countries concerned is essential. Such breakdown should also determine which of the above-mentioned minimum elements are applicable. The starting point is usually a\u00a0triad\u00a0of strong\u00a0state institutions, the articulation of\u00a0civil society\u00a0and\u00a0international support.<\/p>\n

It is always useful to\u00a0promote transparency\u00a0and to make visible the concrete machinations of organized crime, including their often drastic consequences. This applies equally to cases of infiltration of state institutions by individuals who represent private interests or who even want to promote criminal interests in the legislative, executive or jurisdictional power. Here, both the horse and the criminal horsemen should be named as clearly as possible, as it is said in a German idiom.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Photo credits: Cover photo: AP Photo\/Fernando Llano<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Leer en espa\u00f1ol\u00a0aqu\u00ed.   A triad composed of strong state institutions, the articulation of civil society and international support is needed. Among the most effective instruments include actions against money laundering, extinguishing illegally acquired domain and publicly exposing criminal activities and infiltration of state institutions. In recent years, it has become increasingly evident that Latin […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":45,"featured_media":22797,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[513],"tags":[],"country":[888,894],"issue":[870,863,864],"program":[872,871],"resource":[],"class_list":["post-22793","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog","country-america-del-sur","country-ecuador","issue-corruption-and-human-rights","issue-public-security","issue-selection-of-judicial-authorities","program-judicial-independence","program-corruption-and-human-rights"],"acf":{"boton_1":"","url_boton_1\u00ba":"","boton_2":"","url_boton_2":"","boton_3":"","url_boton_3":"","boton_4":"","url_boton_4":"","boton_5":"","url_boton_5":"","boton_6":"","url_boton_6":"","boton_7":"","url_boton_7":"","boton_8":"","url_boton_8":"","boton_9":"","url_boton_9":"","boton_10":"","url_boton_10":""},"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/ap20159773762098-2-scaled.jpg?fit=2560%2C1707&ssl=1","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22793"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/45"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=22793"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22793\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":22799,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22793\/revisions\/22799"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/22797"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=22793"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=22793"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=22793"},{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=22793"},{"taxonomy":"issue","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/issue?post=22793"},{"taxonomy":"program","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/program?post=22793"},{"taxonomy":"resource","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/resource?post=22793"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}