{"id":24258,"date":"2025-11-11T04:00:27","date_gmt":"2025-11-11T09:00:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/?p=24258"},"modified":"2025-11-10T22:23:05","modified_gmt":"2025-11-11T03:23:05","slug":"rethinking-justice-how-prosecutors-can-disrupt-criminal-networks","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/2025\/11\/11\/rethinking-justice-how-prosecutors-can-disrupt-criminal-networks\/","title":{"rendered":"Rethinking Justice: How Prosecutors Can Disrupt Criminal Networks"},"content":{"rendered":"

Leer en espa\u00f1ol.<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Organized crime, illicit networks, and corruption are urgent and deeply intertwined challenges affecting many countries. In numerous contexts, government institutions have not only failed to curb the spread of violence and criminality\u2014they have been co-opted or weakened by the very systems they are meant to control. This dynamic, often referred to as state capture by criminal inertia, results in a dangerous erosion of public trust and institutional integrity. While security and justice are obligations of governments and international actors, civil society has a crucial role to play, particularly in demanding transparency, accountability, and systemic reform.<\/p>\n

At our research group, we study organized crime and corruption not as isolated incidents, but as interconnected phenomena that create complex adaptive networks where political, economic and criminal actors interact in layered and often hidden ways. Through this lens, we have learned that traditional prosecutorial approaches are no longer sufficient. To dismantle entrenched criminal systems, new tools, data-driven strategies, and network-oriented thinking are essential.<\/p>\n

Our latest study explores how justice systems can evolve to meet this challenge. We believe these insights are especially relevant to civil society organizations, investigative journalists, and human rights advocates working to confront impunity and reclaim democratic institutions in Latin America and beyond. As a point case, we studied prosecution strategies in Guatemala’s CICIG, as an emblematic case in the region that offers one of the clearest examples of what happens when organized crime, political elites, and parts of the state itself become intertwined.<\/p>\n

Why Guatemala? A Crucial Case for the Region<\/h2>\n

From 2007 to 2019, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) worked alongside local prosecutors to investigate high-level corruption and dismantle criminal structures embedded within state institutions. Their work generated over a decade of judicial cases and sparked powerful political consequences\u2014including the prosecution of a sitting president and vice president.<\/p>\n

This unique context gave us a rare opportunity: to analyze real-world prosecutorial strategies in action, drawing on publicly available legal data and applying advanced tools like network analysis to understand what works\u2014and what doesn\u2019t\u2014when fighting entrenched criminal systems.<\/p>\n

What We Learned: Five Key Takeaways for Prosecutors and Advocates<\/h2>\n

1. Criminal Networks Are Not Just Criminals<\/h3>\n

Criminal enterprises don\u2019t operate in isolation. They build networks involving public officials, private brokers, financiers, and facilitators. If we only look at individual cases, we miss the bigger picture. Prosecutors need to map the relationships\u2014who collaborates with whom, how different crimes are connected, and which actors hold central roles in sustaining impunity across multiple cases.<\/p>\n

2. Targeting Central Actors Works<\/h3>\n

Some individuals act as key brokers\u2014they connect different parts of the network, enabling illegal flows of money, information, and protection. In Guatemala, targeting high-ranking officials\u2014like ministers and presidential allies\u2014had ripple effects, exposing larger structures and contributing to systemic disruption. For civil society, this underscores the need to monitor who is being charged and advocate for the prosecution of not just symbolic figures, but those who truly hold power within criminal systems.<\/p>\n

3. Severity Should Be Strategic, Not Excessive<\/h3>\n

More charges don\u2019t always mean more impact. What matters is whether the severity of the charges actually threatens the power structures of criminal networks. High-penalty offenses can increase pressure on defendants, help protect cases from legal delays, and send strong public messages. But severity must be used smartly, as a tool for disruption, not just punishment.<\/p>\n

4. Combining Charges Can Expose the Bigger Picture<\/h3>\n

Many offenders operate across multiple crime types: fraud, bribery, money laundering, and even electoral crimes. Prosecutors who bring combined charges, instead of sticking to one category, can better reflect the real complexity of criminal behavior. This approach also helps build stronger, more coherent legal cases. For civil society, it means pushing for a holistic view of criminal accountability, rather than fragmented prosecutions that obscure broader patterns.<\/p>\n

5. Charging Co-Offenders Together Reveals the Network<\/h3>\n

A key insight from our study is the value of what we call triangular imputations<\/em>: when prosecutors charge groups of connected actors involved in the same crime. This strategy reinforces the idea that criminality is collaborative, and that accountability should be, too. It also improves efficiency and evidentiary strength. Advocates and journalists can use this concept to assess whether cases are being pursued as isolated events or as part of a coordinated network approach.<\/p>\n

Toward a More Systemic Justice Strategy<\/h2>\n

The bottom line? Prosecutors in Latin America need to evolve beyond case-by-case thinking. Our research calls for a more systemic, intelligence-driven model, one that uses data, network mapping, and deterrence theory to understand and disrupt the ecosystems of organized crime.<\/p>\n

This shift won\u2019t happen overnight. It requires:<\/p>\n

\u00b7 Training prosecutors in network thinking,
\n\u00b7 Investing in technology and data systems,
\n\u00b7 Protecting prosecutorial independence, and
\n\u00b7 Strengthening civil society oversight to ensure these strategies serve justice, not politics.<\/p>\n

But the payoff is profound: a justice system that not only convicts individuals but weakens the structures that make corruption and organized crime so resilient.<\/p>\n

A Tool for Civil Society<\/h2>\n

This research isn\u2019t just for scholars or legal professionals. We hope it can help civil society groups, investigative journalists, and anti-corruption advocates ask sharper questions:<\/p>\n

\u00b7 Who are the central actors in this case?
\n\u00b7 Are prosecutors using all available legal tools?
\n\u00b7 Are charges reflecting the full range of criminal behavior?
\n\u00b7 Is the justice system addressing networks, or just symptoms?<\/p>\n

By learning to read between the lines of prosecutions and indictments, we can all play a part in pushing for more strategic, systemic accountability.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Read the full academic paper here<\/a> (Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 2025): \u201cProsecution of Complex Criminal Networks: A Multilevel ERGM Approach to CICIG\u2019s Judicial Cases\u201d By Harald Waxenecker, Issa Luna Pla and Jos\u00e9 Roberto Nicol\u00e1s Carlock.<\/em><\/p>\n

Image credit: via Freepik.com<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Leer en espa\u00f1ol.   Organized crime, illicit networks, and corruption are urgent and deeply intertwined challenges affecting many countries. In numerous contexts, government institutions have not only failed to curb the spread of violence and criminality\u2014they have been co-opted or weakened by the very systems they are meant to control. This dynamic, often referred to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":57,"featured_media":24265,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[513],"tags":[],"country":[876,889,877,890,891,885,1000,892,893,878,894,879,880,881,887,882,884,883,895,888,886,897],"issue":[870],"program":[871],"resource":[],"class_list":["post-24258","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog","country-america-central","country-argentina","country-belice","country-bolivia","country-brazil","country-canada","country-caribbean","country-chile","country-colombia","country-costa-rica","country-ecuador","country-el-salvador","country-guatemala","country-honduras","country-mexico","country-nicaragua","country-america-del-norte","country-panama","country-peru","country-america-del-sur","country-estados-unidos-de-america","country-venezuela","issue-corruption-and-human-rights","program-corruption-and-human-rights"],"acf":{"boton_1":"","url_boton_1\u00ba":"","boton_2":"","url_boton_2":"","boton_3":"","url_boton_3":"","boton_4":"","url_boton_4":"","boton_5":"","url_boton_5":"","boton_6":"","url_boton_6":"","boton_7":"","url_boton_7":"","boton_8":"","url_boton_8":"","boton_9":"","url_boton_9":"","boton_10":"","url_boton_10":""},"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/lamp.png?fit=1250%2C600&ssl=1","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/24258"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/57"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=24258"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/24258\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":24264,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/24258\/revisions\/24264"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/24265"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=24258"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=24258"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=24258"},{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=24258"},{"taxonomy":"issue","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/issue?post=24258"},{"taxonomy":"program","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/program?post=24258"},{"taxonomy":"resource","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dplf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/resource?post=24258"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}