The Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) is the network that brings together these entities worldwide and, through its Subcommittee on Accreditation (SCA), assesses whether they maintain conditions of independence, pluralism, effectiveness, and autonomy in accordance with international standards. Currently, the Peruvian Ombudsman’s Office is undergoing a Special Review process.
This procedure is not an administrative formality; it is activated when there are relevant signs of a weakening of the standards of independence and effectiveness required by the Paris Principles. In other words, the debate that takes place in this international forum is not about politicalsympathies or management styles, but about verifiable conditions regarding the actions of a national human rights institution (NHRI). And in this area, the Ombudsman’s Office of Peru today faces serious questions.
According to the SCA report of October 2025, on September 1, 2025, its Secretariat received information submitted by third parties, in this case by dozens of civil society organizations. That document pointed to specific problems, including a lack of transparency in the election of members of the National Board of Justice; criticism of the institution’s position on the amnesty law; restrictions on access to the archives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; deterioration of staff working conditions; budget cuts; and limited territorial presence.
This assessment raises issues that, in any democracy, should set off alarm bells, such as the reduction of civic space, the weakening of control institutions and the rule of law, and the impact on freedom of expression and association, in addition to the Ombudsman’s performance in itsrole as the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture. These are not secondary issues; they are classic indicators of erosion of autonomy, loss of operational capacity, and weakening of institutional oversight.
The central concern is a fundamental one, as it will be analyzed whether the Ombudsman’s Office is in a position to fulfill its mandate in accordance with the Paris Principles. The SCA mentions concerns about its ability to execute its mandate efficiently, about its perceivedindependence and credibility, and about its willingness to address systemic human rights violations.
There is one point that intensifies the concern. The report indicates that the SCA forwarded this information to the Ombudsman’s Office and requested comments, including a reminder. However, according to the document, the institution did not acknowledge receipt or respond.
In a process of this nature, institutional silence is not neutral; it affects credibility. If a NHRI does not respond to questions about its independence and performance within the given time frame, it not only avoids accountability, but also reinforces the perception of an institution that is withdrawn, reactive, and less committed to controlling public power.
This allows for institutional interpretation. The debate centers on whether the Ombudsman’s Office is fulfilling its role as a counterweight. When an Ombudsman’s Office does not act firmly in the face of structural problems, or when it is perceived to be aligned with decisions that weaken rights and controls, its function becomes meaningless.
A NHRI can lose relevance not only because of what it does, but also because of what it decides not to do, what it avoids saying, and the doors it closes. The role of a NHRI is not to be comfortable or complacent with power; it must question, request information, and side with citizenswhose rights are being violated.
For a NHRI , ‘A‘ status is recognition of its independence and enables full participation in international human rights forums, including interaction with United Nations bodies. Losing or weakening this status not only affects the image of the state but also reduces the influence of the Ombudsman’s Office and its ability to act with legitimacy when it is most needed.
It should be emphasized that international accreditation is not lost by accident. It is a consequence of institutional performance and of the inability to maintain autonomy in the face of power and human rights standards, even when doing so is politically costly.
In this case, it should be understood as evidence of a weakening of the democratic control system. If the Ombudsman’s Office does not protect civic space, does not rigorously monitor, does not resist pressure, and does not submit to scrutiny, it ceases to be a guarantor and becomes justanother piece of the institutional landscape accompanying democratic deterioration.
In Latin America, we find useful precedents for understanding what happens when an NHR ceases to defend, and its independence is empty of content. Nicaragua, for example, now has ‘B‘ status after having had A status, following a process that culminated in a recommendation for downgrading. Venezuela also has ‘B‘ status; in a more severe case, in 2025 the SCA made a recommendation to remove its status altogether. Although not identical to the Peruvian case, both show an institutional pattern: when independence ceases to be the cornerstone of a national human rights institution, and the entity ceases to operate as a counterweight, the accreditation system registers it and responds.
This is not an abstract discussion about whether independence is at risk. We are faced with a set of facts that, taken together, describe an Ombudsman’s Office with eroded credibility, weakened capacity for intervention, and relevant questions about its independence. And that, in a country that needs strong control, is exactly the opposite of what an NHRI should be.
When the guarantor fails, the message to society is devastating, as rights may be subject to the convenience of the moment.
Gabriela Mundo is Senior Program Officer at the Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF).
Photo credit: Defensoría del Pueblo del Perú, via X.